Penalty clauses in the Supreme Court: a legitimately interesting decision? by Lindsay, Bobby
  
 
 
 
 
Lindsay, B. (2016) Penalty clauses in the Supreme Court: a legitimately interesting 
decision? Edinburgh Law Review, 20(2), pp. 204-210. 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/152834/  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 1 December 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
A Legitimately Interesting Decision? Penalty Clauses in the Supreme Court 
 
The joint appeals in Cavendish Square Holdings v El Makdessi and Beavis v ParkingEye 1 
offered the UK Supreme Court its first occasion - since moving across Parliament Square 
- to consider the penalty doctrine.  The exercise of judicial control over contractually 
stipulated remedies has been long controversial, and the joint appeals presented an 
opportunity to either modernise its principles, or to repudiate it from English law in its 
entirety. 
  
A. BACKGROUND 
 
For quite some time, the law has appeared relatively settled. The classic test, encapsulated 
in Viscount Dunedin’s speech in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co 
Ltd,2 hinged on whether or not the stipulated sum was arrived at through a genuine 
attempt to pre-estimate the loss that would ensue from breach of the related contractual 
term. If so, the clause would be enforceable as liquidated damages; if not, and the 
stipulated amount bore little relation to the actual loss, the clause would be 
unenforceable as a penalty. But in the supervening century at least two aspects of this 
orthodoxy have been questioned. First, the exclusive focus on loss may be myopic. There 
might be a good justification for a clause otherwise falling foul of the Dunedin formula, 
and the validity of this may be assessable by reference to some interest beyond the 
compensatory. Secondly, the so-called breach limitation, 3  confining the scope of the 
penalty rule to clauses triggered by a breach of contract, has been often denigrated as 
imperilling the doctrine’s protection by rendering it easily circumventable by adroit 
drafting and contractual structuring. 
 
B. FACTS 
 
These issues were brought to the fore in Cavendish and Beavis. However, the transactions 
in the two cases could not be more different.  
 
(1) Cavendish Square Holdings v El Makdessi  
 
Mr. Makdessi, a Lebanese businessman of considerable repute, was at the helm of the 
largest communications group in the Middle East. He and his partner contracted to sell 
the majority of their stake in the group’s holding company to Cavendish. A substantial 
element of the purchase price related to the goodwill surrounding Mr. Makdessi. As his 
continuing loyalty was integral, the agreement contained a series of time-limited 
restrictive covenants precluding him from using his skills or contacts to compete with 
the business. These were breached, triggering the two clauses at issue. Clause 5.1 
disentitled Makdessi, who had already received a substantial up-front sum, from receiving 
interim and final payments potentially totalling $44,181,600. Clause 5.6 would force him 
to sell his remaining stake in the holding company to Cavendish at a value excluding 
goodwill, which was around 23% of the total value. When Cavendish sought to enforce 
these, they were met with the submission that both were unenforceable as penalty 
                                                        
1 [2015] UKSC 67; [2015] 3 WLR 1373.  
2 [1915] AC 79. 
3 Confirmed in Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Co [1983] 1 WLR 399. 
clauses. Burton J rejected that contention,4 but his decision was reversed by the Court of 
Appeal.5 The Supreme Court granted Cavendish permission to appeal. 
 
(2) Beavis v ParkingEye 
 
The British Airways Pension Fund portfolio includes the Riverside Retail Park in 
Chelmsford. The Fund selected ParkingEye to provide car park management services. 
Those wishing to park their car could do so, for free, for two hours. Drivers exceeding 
that period would become liable for an £85 parking charge, reducible to £50 if paid 
within a fortnight. These charges were ParkingEye’s sole source of revenue; no fee was 
received from the landowners or those returning to their cars on time.  Mr Beavis was 
not so prompt, over-parking for fifty-six minutes. He received a parking charge notice, 
which he ignored. Eventually, ParkingEye raised a small claim against him in the County 
Court, which was successful. Beavis’s appeal failed in the Court of Appeal,6 but Beavis 
obtained leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which joined his appeal with that in 
Cavendish.7 
  
C. THE DECISION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
(1) The penalty doctrine retained 
 
Cavendish’s counsel took the bold step of inviting the Supreme Court to abrogate the 
penalty doctrine, or at least to hold that it had no applicability in the context of high-
powered commercial actors who have easy access to legal advice. Each of the Justices 
rejected any inroads into the general application of the doctrine. Those seeking for a 
principled justification for its continued operation are, with respect, liable to be 
disappointed. 
 
 In their joint judgment,8 Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Sumption JSC confessed that 
the penalty rule would likely not be developed if the modern judiciary were working from 
a blank canvas, and their objections to abrogation arose merely out of fidelity to 
precedent and a distaste for judicial legislation.9 Lord Mance JSC shared these concerns,10 
but also considered, in light of the ubiquity of the doctrine across both civil law11 and 
common law12 systems,  and its retention in proposals for harmonisation,13  that it would 
be “odd… if the United Kingdom [sic] separated itself from so general a consensus.”14 
Lord Hodge JSC was similarly impressed by the apparent universality of the rule against 
penalties,15 and thought, as did Lord Mance,16 that the statutory control of contract terms 
covered too narrow a field to guard against all potential instances of oppression.17  
                                                        
4 [2012] EWHC 3582 (Comm); [2013] 1 All ER (Comm) 787. 
5 [2013] EWCA Civ 1539; [2014] 2 All ER (Comm) 125. 
6 [2015] EWCA Civ 402. 
7 Beavis also challenged the charge under the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 
1999 (SI 1999/2083). That issue will not be discussed here; save for noting that there is much to 
be said for the minority view of Lord Toulson JSC. 
8 With which Lord Carnwarth JSC concurred. 
9 Para 36. 
10 Paras 162-163. 
11 Para 165. 
12 Para 166. His Lordship included Scotland within this category. 
13 Para 164. 
14 Para 166. 
15 Paras 263 and 265. 
 
(2) The breach limitation affirmed 
 
Contrastingly, counsel for Mr Makdessi urged a substantial extension of the penalty 
doctrine by the removal of the breach limitation. To do so would be to follow the High 
Court of Australia in Andrews v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group.18 The Supreme 
Court declined to go down that same path. The High Court of Australia’s analysis 
confirmed the continuing existence of a wider equitable jurisdiction. But, for Lords 
Neuberger and Sumption, that conclusion was historically inaccurate and predicated on a 
rejection of the fusion of law and equity. 19  There was no convincing evidence of a 
continuing equitable jurisdiction in English law, and the fact that the breach limitation 
existed in Scotland – where law and equity have never been considered separate– was 
thought to justify its existence south of the border.20 Lords Hodge21 and Mance22 did not 
consider this issue necessary for the disposal of the appeals, but the latter did not see the 
retention of the breach limitation as necessarily irrational.23  
 
None of these arguments offer a positive, non-historical, justification for the continued 
operation of the breach limitation. However, it is submitted that the Supreme Court was 
correct to be wary of removing that limitation by judicial fiat. To do so would have 
rendered every clause in every contract potentially reviewable, which would have 
necessitated widespread review, re-negotiation, and revision.  
 
The Supreme Court delineated the applicability of the penalty doctrine in terms of 
primary and secondary obligations.24 A primary obligation, being one to tender some 
form of performance under the terms of the contract, will not be reviewable, but a 
secondary obligation arising on breach of that primary obligation will be. However, as 
shall be seen, this distinction is not easy to apply. 
 
(3) The test refined: legitimate interests 
 
Both ParkingEye and Cavendish largely accepted that the clauses they were claiming the 
benefit of were not based on any genuine pre-estimate of loss. Counsel for Mr Beavis 
submitted that this was therefore the end of the matter: the Dunedin formula, with its 
exclusive focus on the disparity between the stipulation and the loss suffered, was the 
sole enquiry.  
 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that submission. First, Lords Neuberger and 
Sumption thought that too much had been made of Viscount Dunedin’s speech.25 He 
was, after all, only one of five Law Lords in the Dunlop case, and no other members of 
the Appellate Committee expressed agreement with him, or reasoned in identical terms.26 
                                                                                                                                                              
16 Paras 167. 
17 Paras 260-262. 
18 [2012] HCA 30; (2012) 247 CLR. 
19 Para 42.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Para 241. 
22 Para 130. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See e.g. Paras 13-14.  
25 Para 22. 
26 Para 22-24. 
Secondly, Viscount Dunedin himself did not view his propositions as a universal test; 
they were merely suggested as being of assistance in the case before him, which 
concerned a simple liquidated damages clause.27 Thirdly, a series of cases which looked 
beyond a simple arithmetical calculation, and held clauses that did not involve a pre-
estimate of loss as justifiable for other reasons, clutched at the proper test.28   
 
That test, as reformulated by Lords Neuberger and Sumption, was: 
 
whether the impugned provision is a secondary obligation which imposes a 
detriment out of all proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in 
the enforcement of the primary obligation.29 
 
Each of their Lordships confirmed that the overriding test was one of extravagance or 
unconscionability.30 The Dunedin formula was viewed as potentially still helpful in cases 
involving simple liquidated damages clauses,31 but compensation was not the sole interest 
that an agreed damages clause may pursue legitimately. 32  Moreover, that the sum 
stipulated must be “out of all proportion” 33  or “extravagant, exorbitant or 
unconscionable”34 compared to those interests suggests a very light-touch doctrine.   
 
 
D. THE DECISIONS: APPLICATION 
 
(1) Cavendish 
 
The Supreme Court was divided over whether or not clauses 5.1 and 5.6 were even 
subject to the rule against penalties. Unfortunately, however, the exact division is unclear.  
Clause 5.1, removing Mr Makdessi’s entitlement to the final two payments, was 
characterised as forming part of the consideration paid by Cavendish for the company, 
and thus as a primary obligation, by Lords Neuberger and Sumption.35 Lord Hodge saw 
the force of that argument,36 but he and Lord Clarke JSC37 preferred to keep an open 
mind. As for Lord Mance, his Lordship appeared inclined to categorise clause 5.1 as a 
secondary obligation, because he subjects it to the penal test that would not arise if it 
embodied a primary obligation. 38   However, further on, the clause is described as 
amounting “to a reshaping of the parties’ primary relationship”, 39  which suggests a 
primary obligation classification.  This ambiguity is not resolved by Lord Toulson JSC, 
who expresses agreement with the judgments of both Lords Hodge and Mance.40  
 
                                                        
27 Ibid, quoting Dunlop, 87. 
28 Paras 26-28.  
29 Para 32 (emphasis added).  
30 Harking back to, e.g, Forrest and Barr v. Henderson, Coulborn & Co. (1869) 8 M 187. 
31 Para 22.  
32 cf Ringrow v BP Australia [2005] HCA 71; (2005) 224 CLR 656, para 27. 
33 Para 32. 
34 Para 152 (Lord Mance); see too Para 255 (Lord Hodge: “exorbitant or unconscionable”. 
35 Para 74. 
36 Para 270. 
37 Para 291. 
38 Para 181. 
39 Para 183. 
40 Para 292. 
Clause 5.6, the forced share-sale provision, was again characterised by Lords Neuberger 
and Sumption as forming part of the parties’ primary obligations.41 This is because it 
reflected the diminution in the consideration Cavendish would be willing to pay in the 
circumstances of Mr Makdessi’s disloyalty. Lord Hodge again saw this as a strong 
argument, but preferred to conceive clause 5.6 as a secondary obligation,42 a contention 
with which Lord Clarke agreed. 43  Lord Mance is again uncharacteristically opaque, 
describing 5.6 as also part of the parties’ primary relationship but yet again going on to 
assess its proportionality in relation to any legitimate interest.44  Lord Toulson again 
simply concurs with both Lords Hodge and Mance without alluding to their dissensus  
on this point.45 
 
This uncertainty is deeply unhelpful for future cases, where the delineation between 
primary and secondary obligation may be key. It would have been preferable for Lords 
Hodge and Clarke to express a concluded view on Clause 5.1, for Lord Mance to be 
more explicit in his treatment of the two clauses, and for Lord Toulson to express a view 
on the differences between the judgments of Lord Hodge and Lord Mance. 
 
Precise characterisation of the clauses was, however, ultimately not necessary to dispose 
of the case, as each of their Lordships viewed the clauses as justifiable. As for Clause 5.1, 
Cavendish had “a very substantial legitimate interest”46 in ensuring that the price paid for 
the business was commensurate with its value, and the clause was a mechanism that 
ensured the value of the business reflected the fact that Mr Makdessi’s loyalty could no 
longer be counted on. 47  The centrality of his co-operation to the goodwill of the 
company meant that it was irrelevant that a relatively minor breach of a restrictive 
covenant might trigger Clause 5.1.48  Similar reasons justified Clause 5.6: Cavendish were 
entitled to provide that, after his attempts to undermine the business, they would not pay 
for Mr Makdessi’s shares at a value which did not reflect actuality.49 This was a perfectly 
legitimate way of attempting to secure compliance with the restrictive covenants. 50 
Moreover, for each clause, it was important that both were the product of a “carefully 
negotiated agreement between informed and legally advised parties at arms’ length”.51 
 
(2) Beavis  
 
The Supreme Court concluded that a contract had been formed between Mr Beavis and 
ParkingEye,52 and ParkingEye accepted that the charge was operable on breach. Lords 
Neuberger and Sumption held that the scheme had two legitimate purposes: to free the 
car park from congestion to allow a steady stream of customers to park and have access 
to the retail park; and to provide ParkingEye with its sole stream of revenue. 53 
                                                        
41 Para 83. 
42 Para 280. 
43 Para 291. 
44 Para 183. 
45 Para 292. 
46 Para 278 (Lord Hodge). 
47 Para 75; see too para 274. 
48 Para 180; see too paras 275-276. 
49 Para 82. 
50 Para 282. 
51 Para 181 (Lord Mance); see too para 35 (Lords Neuberger and Sumption); para 282 (Lord 
Hodge). 
52 See similarly for Scots law University of Edinburgh v Onifade 2005 SLT (Sh Ct) 63. 
53 Para 98. 
Importantly, their Lordships noted that, despite the way in which it had formulated the 
test,54 it was not restricted to a consideration of the interests of the innocent party.55 
Instead, the interests of not just ParkingEye, but also of the landowners, the retailer-
tenants, and the wider public, could be pressed into action to justify the operation of this 
clause. While it may be difficult, or artificial, sometimes to separate the interests of the 
innocent party from its client or principal, the wide range of interests that may be taken 
into account when justifying a clause indicates the difficulty of impugning a clause as 
penal. It is therefore unsurprising that their Lordships held that an £85 charge was not 
exorbitant or unconscionable in light of all those interests.  
 
E: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to abolish the penalty doctrine, those who would 
like to see the rule against penalties meet its quietus may draw some solace from the 
decision. The retention of the breach limitation, and the adoption of a broader approach 
to the aims and interests that a clause may legitimately safeguard, severely attenuates the 
scope for judicial intervention in the context of agreed remedy clauses. Sophisticated 
parties, previously able to avoid its operation by flouting the breach limitation, now also 
are able to insulate clauses by identifying some legitimate objective that they may pursue. 
So long as the stipulated sum is not outrageous in relation to that interest, it is difficult to 
conceive of a case where a court would intervene in such a scenario. 
 
The Scottish Law Commission is (re-)considering56 the law on penalty clauses as part of 
its project on “Contract Law in Light of the Draft Common Frame of Reference”. The 
equivalent test in the DCFR is whether the clause is “grossly excessive in relation to the 
loss resulting from the non-performance and the other circumstances.”57 The difference 
between this and the Cavendish test may be imperceptible. The more interesting question 
may therefore be whether the Scottish Law Commission will step where the Supreme 
Court did not dare to tread: either by removing the breach limitation,58 or by jettisoning 
the penalty doctrine in its entirety.  
 
Bobby Lindsay 
University of Glasgow 
                                                        
54 Para 33 explicitly limits this to the interests of the “innocent party”. 
55 Para 99. See also para 197 (Lord Mance). 
56It previously turned to the subject in SLC Discussion Paper 103 on Penalty Clauses (1997) and 
SLC Report 171 (1999). 
57 Book III, 3.712. 
58 As it was so minded in 1999: SLC Report 171, Recommendation 2. 
